Abstract. We pursue in this paper our study of approximations of values and -saddle-point policies in dynamic zero-sum games. After extending the general theorem for approximation, we study zero-sum stochastic games with countable state space, and unbounded immediate reward. We focus on the expected average payo criterion. We use some tools developed in the rst paper, to obtain the convergence of the values as well as the convergence of the saddle-point policies in various approximation problems. We consider several schemes of truncation of the state space (e.g. nite state approximation) and approximations of games with discount factor close to one for the game with expected average cost. We use the extension of the general Theorem for approximation to study approximations in stochastic games with complete information. We nally consider the problem of approximating the sets of policies. We obtain some general results that we apply to a pursuit evasion di erential game.
1. Introduction. We pursue in this paper our study of approximations of values and saddle-point policies in dynamic zero-sum games. In a previous paper 34], we developed some tools for approximating zero-sum games, and applied them to stochastic games with discounted payo criterion. In this paper we extend the general theory for approximation to handle cases where a value does not exist for the limit game, and we apply the general theorems for approximation to some dynamic zero-sum games.
We rst consider approximation problems arising in stochastic games with expected average cost: nite state approximation of stochastic games with a countable state space, and convergence of stochastic games with discounted cost to the stochastic game with average cost. We then consider approximations in stochastic games with complete information, and problems in dynamic games related to discretization of the strategy sets.
There is a rich literature on nite state approximation in the context of a single controller. The discounted reward was extensively studied, see 2, 13, 21, 22, 35, 36] , and 29, 37, 38] for related discretization results. For the expected average cost, there exist only few works on state approximations in the context of control, and none in the context of stochastic games. Even if existing schemes could be extended to the setting of a stochastic game, they are still quite restricted since their convergence (in the setting of control) was established under conditions that seem very strong, and quite often non-applicable. Thomas and Stengos obtained several schemes for nite state approximations. They impose, some scrambling conditions which should hold uniformly in the states. They do not seem to hold for queueing applications, such as the models in 3, 4, 7] . Altman introduced several nite state approximation schemes 1, 2] for constrained control. They do not require the scrambling conditions, but have other restrictive conditions: the scheme in 1] requires some monotone structure on the immediate cost, and holds for immediate costs that are only functions of the state, and not of the actions. The scheme in 2] has the nite neighbor restriction, i.e., from each state, only nitely many states are accessible within one step. The two approximation schemes that we introduce in the current paper relax the above restrictions, and are thus also useful and new in the case of a single controller. In addition to the convergence of the value, which is the question studied in most of the papers on state approximations, we obtain (i) the convergence of the policies, (ii) the robustness of policies, i.e. an equilibrium point for the limiting (in nite state) stochastic game G = G 1 is shown to be an -equilibrium for the approximating games G n for n large enough. On the other hand, for any , the equilibrium policies for G n are almost optimal for the limiting game, for all n large enough.
In the previous paper 34] we focused on approximations of stochastic games with discounted cost and bounded reward, and mentioned that standard techniques can be used to transform problems with unbounded reward to problems with bounded ones. This is, however, not the case for the expected average payo criterion. The question of existence of value and of equilibrium stationary policies (under some recurrence conditions) for the case of unbounded reward was solved recently in 7, 8, 12, 30] . The growing interest in stochastic games with unbounded cost in recent years was partly driven by applications of stochastic games in telecommunications systems in general, and in queueing systems in particular. Although queues are always nite in practice (which results in a nite state space description), models of in nite queues are frequently more useful since they are usually easier to solve. Indeed, several dynamic games arising in such applications were explicitly solved 7, 9], or at least reduced to the search for equilibrium policies among small classes of policies 4, 5, 7] . The scheduling problem described in 7, 9], the routing problem into two queues 4, 7] , the ow and service control in 5] have not been solved for the case of nite state space, since there is an e ect of the boundaries due to the niteness of the queues that destroys the nice structure of the problem with in nite state space. In all the above problems, it is unnatural to consider bounded costs. Since costs represent queue lengths or waiting times, these typically grow to in nity as the number of customers in the queues grows to in nity. The theory developed in this paper allows the use of the equilibrium policies obtained for the in nite queues to construct -equilibrium policies for the corresponding problems with nite queues, provided that they are su ciently large.
A second issue in this paper is the convergence of stochastic games in the discount factor. The convergence of the value and equilibrium policies for discounted cost stochastic games to those of the average cost game are well known, see e.g. 18]. These were extended recently to unbounded cost (see 8, 30] ). We not only obtain an alternative proof for the above convergence of the values and policies, but also obtain new robustness results.
When the players are restricted to use pure strategies in a stochastic game, the game in general does not have a value anymore. Using an extension of the general approximation theorems, we study approximations under that restriction. This yields approximation theorems for stochastic games with complete information (where player 2 knows at time t the action taken by player 1 at time t).
Finally, we consider the problem of approximating the set of policies by other sets. We obtain a general approximating theorem for the case that the strategy sets are endowed with the Hausdor metric. We apply the theorem to a zero-sum pursuit evasion di erential game introduced in 11, 31] .
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin in Section 2 by citing and extending the general theory for approximations, developed in 34]. We then introduce in Section 3 the model, notation and assumptions for the stochastic game. We present two schemes for state approximation in Section 4. The convergence in the discount factor is established in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss approximations for stochastic games with complete information. The approximation of the strategy sets is nally presented in Section 7 together with the application to the pursuit evasion game.
2. Key theorems for approximations. We consider the following sequence G n = (S n ; U n ; V n ) n = 1; 2; :::; 1 of generic zero-sum games where U n is the set of strategies (or policies) of player one and V n is the set of strategies of player two for the nth game. We assume that both U n and V n are endowed with some topology.
S n : U n V n ! IR is a measurable function for all n. We A strategy u 2 U n is said to be -optimal for player one in game n if
8u 2 U n ; (2.2) which is equivalent to inf v2Vn S n (u ; v) R n ? . It is said to be strong -optimal for player one in game n if it satis es inf v2Vn S n (u ; v) R n ? :
A strategy v 2 V n is said to be -optimal for player two in game n if which is equivalent to sup u2Un S n (u; v ) R n + . It is said to be strong -optimal if sup u2Un S n (u; v ) R n + :
Note that strong -optimality implies -optimality. If a game has a value R n = R n then strong -optimality is equivalent to -optimality.
Assume that (S n ; U n ; V n ) converge (in some sense) to (S; U; V ). We are interested in the following questions:
(Q1) Convergence of the values: does R n (or R n ) converge to R?
(Q2) Convergence of policies: Fix some 0. Let n be a sequence of positive real numbers such that lim n!1 n . Assume that u n and v n are n -optimal policies for the nth game. Are u n and v n almost optimal for the limit game, for all n large enough?
(Q3) Let u 2 U (resp. v 2 V ) be some limit point of u n (resp. v n ), de ned above. Is u (resp. v) -optimal for the limit game? (Q4) Robustness of the optimal policy: If u (resp. v ) is an -optimal policy for the limit game, can we derive of it an almost (strong) optimal policy for the nth approximating game, for all n large enough? in (Q2)) is 0 -optimal for the limit game, for all n N. (3) Let u (resp. v ) be -optimal for the limit game. Then for all 0 > + 3 1 , there exists N( 0 ) such that 1 n (u ) (resp. 2 n (v )) is strong 0 -optimal for the nth approximating game, for all n N( 0 ). Suppose u 2 U (resp. v 2 V ) is a limit point of 1 n (u n ) (resp. 2 n (v n )). Then u (resp. v) is ( + 5 1 )-optimal for the limit game.
Remark 2.2. (i) Whenever U n = U and V n = V do not depend on n, n and n will be chosen as the identity maps.
(ii) It follows from the proof of part (1) We now relax the assumption that the limit game has a value : R 1 6 = R 1 . We show that Theorem 2.1 still holds, by appropriately enlarging the policy spaces and rede ning the cost, so that the upper (or lower) value becomes a real value of a new game.
We consider the convergence of the upper values (and corresponding optimal or almost optimal policies) of the approximating games to those of the limit game. The corresponding convergence for the lower values are obtained in a similar way. De ne U n = f the class of functions V n ! U n g. De ne the costŜ n : U n V n ! IR bŷ S n ( ; v) = S n ( (v); v). Lemma 2.4. (i) For all n, the new game G n = (Ŝ n ; U n ; V n ) has a value R n , and R n = R n .
(ii) v is ?optimal for player 2 in game G n if and only if it is ?optimal in game G n .
Proof. The rst equality in (2.5) is due to the following. Clearly, By using the new games for which the values exist, and applying Theorem 2.1, we may conclude the following convergence properties of the original games.
Theorem 2.5. Assume that the functions n and n exist as in Theorem 2.1, and that conditions (A1) and (A2) hold. Then (1) lim n!1 R n = R, lim n!1 R n = R. (2) For any 0 > +3 1 , there exists N such that 1 n (u n ) (resp. 2 n (v n ), see de nitions in (Q2)) is 0 -optimal for the limit game, for all n N. (3) Let u (resp. v ) be -optimal for the limit game. Then for all 0 > + 3 1 , there exists N( 0 ) such that 1 n (u ) (resp. 2 n (v )) is 0 -optimal for the n approximating game, for all n N( 0 ).
Proof. Consider the new games G n de ned above. We show that the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 hold also for G n . The mapping~ 2 n ;~ 2 n for the new games are unchanged;~ 2 n = 2 n ;~ 2 n = 2 n :
The mappings~ 1 n : U n ! U and~ 1 n : U ! U n for the new games are de ned as
8v 2 V n :
With these de nitions as well as the de nition of the costsŜ n , it follows that (A1) and (A2) hold for G n . The proof now follows by Lemma 2.4.
We may further obtain convergence results for the optimal (or -optimal) responses (in case that the value of the limit game does not exist). To simplify the formulation, this is done below in terms of the new games G n : Theorem 2.6. Consider the new games G n , and let n ; v n be de ned as u n in (Q2) (above Theorem 2.1). Under the conditions of Theorem 2.5,
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(1) lim n!1 R n = R = R, (2) For any 0 > +3 1 , there exists N such that~ 1 n ( n ) (resp.~ 2 n (v n )) is 0 ?optimal for G 1 , for all n N. (3) Let be -optimal for player 1 in the limit game G 1 . Then for all 0 > + 3 1 , there exists N( 0 ) such that~ 1 n ( ) (resp.~ 2 n (v )) is 0 -optimal for the n approximating game G n for all n N( 0 ).
Next, we consider the result corresponding to statement (4) in Theorem 2.1. Theorem 2.7. Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.6 hold, that the set of response-strategies for player 2 in games G n is endowed with some topology, and that (A3) and (A4) hold for game G 1 . Then statement (4) Let U and V be the set of behavioral strategies for both players. A strategy u 2 U is a sequence u = (u 0 ; u 1 ; :::) where u t is a probability measure over the available actions,
given the whole history of previous states and of previous actions of both players as well as the current state.
A Markov policy q = fq 0 ; q 1 ; :::g is a policy (for either player one or two) where q t is allowed to depend only on t and on the state at time t. A stationary (mixed) policy g for player one is characterized by a conditional distribution p g ( j j) over A j , so that p g (A j j j) = 1, which is interpreted as the distribution over the actions available at state j which player I uses when it is in state j. With some abuse of notation, we shall set g( j j) = p g ( j j) for stationary g. Let Denote by P(u; v) the (in nite dimensional) matrix whose (j; k)th component equals p(j; u; v; k). Similarly, denote by r(u; v) the column vector whose jth component equals r(j; u; v).
Next (iv) Let (u; v) be stationary policies such that u(i); v(i) are optimal for the dummy game in the curly brackets in (3.4). Then, they are optimal for the stochastic game. 4 . State truncation and approximation. In the following approximating schemes, we modify the limit stochastic game in the following way. We consider an increasing sequence of sets of states I 1 ; I 2 ; ::: converging to I, such that 0 2 I 1 . The nth stochastic game is restricted to the set I n . In the game G n , we modify the transition probabilities so as to eliminate all transitions outside the set I n . The two schemes will di er by the way that such transitions will be replaced. For i 2 I n , S n (i; u; v) is de ned as (3.3), where the expectation is taken with respect to the signed measure generated by the new transition probabilities (4.1). S n (i; u; v) is de ned to be 0 for i = 2 I n , for all u and v. One can show using Theorem 3.2 that for all n, g n and v n indeed exist and are unique.
Moreover, we have that :
R n (i) = Val fS n (i; u; v)g u;v = g n 8i 2 I:
In order to prove the convergence of the state approximation scheme we introduce the following quantities : := infft 1; I t = 0g is the time to reach state zero (with the convention that infft : t 2 ;g = 1). The uniqueness follows from the fact that the above equations are contracting due to (B2). Note that functions w(:; u; v) and w n (:; u; v) are -bounded for all pair (u; v) on every subset J of I. Since both n (0; u; v) and (0; u; v) are both non-zero and nite, it follows (see Chung 14] p. 91-92) that the expected average cost is given by the following ratio between the total cost and the expected hitting time of state zero S(i; u; v) = w(0; u; v) E (0; u; v) and S n (i; u; v) = w n (0; u; v) E n (0; u; v) : Proof. Fix some initial state i. We use Theorem 2.1. We begin by establishing conditions (A1) and (A2). Since U = U n and V n = V for each n, it su ces to show that S n (u; v) := S n (i; u; v) converges to S(u; v) := S(i; u; v) uniformly on I. Hence, we set 1 n , 2 n , 1 n and 2 n to be identity.
Let J be a given subset of I, and (u; v) a pair of strategies. To avoid cumbersome notations we will write w(:) (resp w n (:)) instead of w(:; u; v) (resp w n (:; u; v)). We rst want to prove that lim
In the last inequality the rst term can be bounded by k w ? w n k in the case of in nite queue, then in the problem with truncated state space, which corresponds to a nite queue, it is replaced by a transition from L to L. In the previous scheme, it would be replaced by a transition to state 0. This would be especially undesirable, since in queueing problems, we usually have the property of transitions to closest neighbors : from each state, only nitely many neighboring states can be reached in one step. So, having a transition from state L to 0 does not describe a realistic model of a nite queue.
Let fq n (i; a; b; j); i; j 2 I;a 2 A;b 2 Bg be sequences of measures such that for all n, i 2 I, a 2 A;b 2 B, q n (i; a; b; j) 0 for j 2 I n ; q n (i; a; b; j) = 0 for j = 2 I n ; We make the following assumption on and on I n . For any n > m and i 2 I n n I m ; (i) sup j2Im (j):
For i 2 I n , S n (i; u; v) is de ned as (3.3) , where the expectation is taken with respect to the measure generated by the new transition probabilities (4.10). We set S n (i; u; v) = 0 for all i = 2 I n .
Theorem 4.2. Assume (B1)-(B3), and consider the above nite approximation scheme. Then all statements of Theorem 2.1 hold.
Proof. We consider as in the previous section the total expected cost and total expected time till between consecutive epochs that state 0 is reached. By similar arguments to those in the previous Scheme one then establishes that S n (u; v) converge to S(u; v) uniformly in all stationary policies (the exact proof can be found in 6] Chapter 8). This implies assumptions (A1) and (A2). Assumptions (A3) and (A4) relate only to the limit game, and therefore the proof is the same as in the previous Section. The theorem now follows from Theorem 2.1.
5. Convergence of the discounted cost to the average cost. Conditions for the convergence of the value and equilibrium policies for discounted cost stochastic games to those of the average cost game are well known, see e.g. 18]. These were extended recently to unbounded cost (see 8, 30] ). Theorem 2.1 enables us not only to obtain an alternative proof for the above convergence of the values and policies, but also to obtain new robustness results as in Theorem 5.2 below.
De ne the -discounted game payo (ii) Optimal stationary policies exist for both players for any discount factor 0 < < 1 (they are said to be -optimal). (iii) Any limit-point (as tends to one) of -optimal stationary policies is expected average optimal; moreover, the value of the discounted games converge to the value of the expected average game. (ii) For any > 0 there exists some 0 < 1 such that for any 0 < 1 and any stationary pair u ; v which are -optimal, (u ; v ) is -optimal for the expected average game. 12 Proof. It is su cient to prove that (A1) and (A2) in Theorem 2.1 hold. This follows indeed from the fact that We shall now show the usefulness of the above results for stochastic games with complete information, in the sense used e.g. by K enle 24, 25] . There, one of the players, say player 2, has at each time t the additional information of the action chosen by player 1 at time t (i.e., in addition to the information of all past states and actions of both players, plus the current state). The information structure for the other player is unchanged. We thus de ne the class of policies V to be the set of policies of the form v = (v 0 ; v 1 ; :::) where v t is a probability measure over B conditioned on the history (x 0 ; a 0 ; b 0 ; x 1 ; a 1 ; b 1 ; :::; x t?1 ; a t?1 ; b t?1 ; x t ; a t ).
Consider the following game : G 1 = (S; U; V ), where S is given by (3.3) for some xed initial state i. ( The results below will also hold for the expected discounted cost with in nite horizon, considered in 34].) We shall be interested in approximating 7 . A nite approximation of strategy sets. Another type of approximation that arises in dynamic games is the countable or nite approximation of strategy sets. This step is necessary when we want to perform numerical computations, and when the strategy sets are in nite or continuous, or both.
Let U and V be metric sets of policies for players one and two, and let S(u; v) correspond to the cost associated to the pair of strategies u 2 U; v 2 V. Introduce the following sets of strategies : U U and V V, and the sequences fU n g n2IN U and fV n g n2IN V. U n and V n are assumed to be countable or nite sets of policies. To prove (A1) we shall show that for all , there exists N = N( ) such that for all n > N, and for all u n 2 U n , v 2 V we have :
S(u n ; 2 n (v))?S( 1 n (u n ); v) = S(u n ; 2 n (v))?S(u n ; v)+S(u n ; v)?S( 1 n (u n ); v) < : (7. 3)
Since S is upper semicontinuous in v uniformly in u, there exists 1 such that if d( 2 n (v); v) 1 , S(u n ; 2 n (v))?S(u n ; v) =2. Choose 0 and 3 such that 0 + 3 = 1 in (7.2), there exists N 1 such that for all n > N 1 , S(u n ; 2 n (v)) ? S(u n ; v) 2 : (7.4) Similarly, it follows from (7.1) and since S is lower semicontinuous in u uniformly in v that there exists N 2 such that for all n > N 2 S(u n ; v) ? S( 1 n (u n ); v) 2 : (7.5) (7.4) and (7.5) imply (7.3) by choosing N = sup(N 1 ; N 2 ), which concludes the proof. Remark 7.2. In many applications (e.g. 11, 31]), the strategy sets are compact. Hence it su ces to require in (A' 3) and (A' 4) the semi-continuity properties; the uniform semi-continuity is then a consequence of the compactness of the strategy sets.
As an application of the Theorem 7.1, we present the following continuous time di erential pursuit evasion game by Bernhard and Shinar 11, 31] . We shall use the same notation as in 11, 31] . The game is governed by a di erential equation where w is a noise and h a , h b are globally Lipschitz over I. They are restricted to using feedback strategies (a(t) = 1 (y a (t)), (b(t) = 2 (y b (t))) Lipschitz continuous, then the set of strategies is compact in the topology of the uniform convergence. It is assumed 15 that the noise model and the solution concept of the di erential equations are such that the payo P (the expected value of a continuous function of closest approach) is a continuous function of the strategies for the topology of uniform convergence.
If 1 and 2 are compact metric strategies spaces and 1 and 2 are closed subsets of 1 and 2 respectively and U = M 1 ( 1 ) and V = M 1 ( 2 ) are the sets of probability measures over 1 and 2 , we know that there exist optimal mixed strategies that achieve the value V ( 1 ; 2 ) = min u2U max v2V J(u; v) = Z 1 Z 2 P( 1 ; 2 )du( 1 )dv ( 2 ) Bernhard and Shinar establish the convergence of the values of some approximating problems to the value of the original one. We show that, in fact, all the statements concerning the convergence of policies in 
